David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):157 – 169 (2002)
The writings of Kuhn and Feyerabend on incommensurability challenged the idea that science progresses towards the truth. Davidson famously criticized the notion of incommensurability, arguing that it is incoherent. Davidson's argument was in turn criticized by Kuhn and others. This article argues that, although at least some of the objections raised against Davidson's argument are formally correct, they do it very little harm. What remains of the argument once the objections have been taken account of is still quite damaging to the thesis that formerly endorsed scientific theories are incommensurable with those of today's science.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Xiang Chen (1997). Thomas Kuhn's Latest Notion of Incommensurability. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (2):257-273.
Nathaniel Goldberg & Matthew Rellihan (2008). Incommensurability, Relativism, Scepticism: Reflections on Acquiring a Concept. Ratio 21 (2):147–167.
Howard Sankey (2009). Scientific Realism and the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):196-202.
Eric Oberheim & Paul Hoyningen-Huene (1997). Incommensurability, Realism, and Meta-Incommensurability. Theoria 12 (3):447-465.
Howard Sankey (1993). Kuhn's Changing Concept of Incommensurability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):759-774.
John Collier (1984). Pragmatic Incommensurability. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:146 - 153.
Maria Caamaño (2009). A Structural Analysis of the Phlogiston Case. Erkenntnis 70 (3):331 - 364.
S. K. Arun Murthi & Sundar Sarukkai (2009). Multisemiosis and Incommensurability. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):297-311.
Harold I. Brown (1983). Incommensurability. Inquiry 26 (1):3 – 29.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads74 ( #28,078 of 1,696,808 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #187,594 of 1,696,808 )
How can I increase my downloads?