David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361 - 375 (2009)
It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. As an interesting aside, it will be seen that these sentences also harbor a lesson for Bayesian epistemology itself.
|Keywords||Assertion Moore Bayesian epistemology|
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References found in this work BETA
J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
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David Phiroze Christensen (2004). Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Igor Douven & Jos Uffink (2012). Quantum Probabilities and the Conjunction Principle. Synthese 184 (1):109-114.
Igor Douven & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2009). Fricker on Testimonial Justification. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):36-44.
Charlie Pelling (2013). Assertion and Safety. Synthese 190 (17):3777-3796.
Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp (2012). In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno. Dialectica 66 (2):289-297.
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