Assertion, Moore, and bayes

Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361 - 375 (2009)
It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. As an interesting aside, it will be seen that these sentences also harbor a lesson for Bayesian epistemology itself.
Keywords Assertion  Moore  Bayesian epistemology
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    References found in this work BETA
    Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
    Keith DeRose (1991). Epistemic Possibilities. Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Igor Douven & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2009). Fricker on Testimonial Justification. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):36-44.
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