David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361 - 375 (2009)
It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. As an interesting aside, it will be seen that these sentences also harbor a lesson for Bayesian epistemology itself.
|Keywords||Assertion Moore Bayesian epistemology|
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Philip Kitcher (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions. Oxford University Press.
J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Peter Pagin (2015). Problems with Norms of Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1).
Charlie Pelling (2013). Assertion and Safety. Synthese 190 (17):3777-3796.
John N. Williams (2015). Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey. Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.
Igor Douven & Jos Uffink (2012). Quantum Probabilities and the Conjunction Principle. Synthese 184 (1):109-114.
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