David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410 (2002)
The Lottery Paradox and the Preface Paradox both involve the thesis that high probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The standard solution to these paradoxes denies that rational acceptability is deductively closed. This solution has a number of untoward consequences. The present paper suggests that a better solution to the paradoxes is to replace the thesis that high probability suffices for rational acceptability with a somewhat stricter thesis. This avoids the untoward consequences of the standard solution. The new solution will be defended against a seemingly obvious objection. 1 The paradoxes of rational acceptability 2 The standard solution 3 A new solution to the paradoxes 4 Basic assumptions 5 The new solution defended 6 Conclusion 7 Appendix.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Martin Smith (2010). A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):821-831.
Jing Zhu (2010). On the Principle of Intention Agglomeration. Synthese 175 (1):89 - 99.
Igor Douven (2009). Assertion, Moore, and Bayes. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361 - 375.
By Igor Douven (2008). The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204–225.
Igor Douven, Leon Horsten & Jan-Willem Romeijn (2010). Probabilist antirealism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):38-63.
Similar books and articles
Thomas Kroedel (2012). The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility. Analysis 72 (1):57-60.
W. H. Baumer (1963). Von Wright's Paradoxes. Philosophy of Science 30 (2):165-172.
Laurence Goldstein (2009). A Consistent Way with Paradox. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):377 - 389.
Laurence Goldstein (2005). Introduction. The Monist 88 (1):3-10.
I. Grattan-Guinness (1998). Discussion. Structural Similarity of Structuralism? Comments on Priest's Analysis of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference. Mind 107 (428):823-834.
Igor Douven (2003). The Preface Paradox Revisited. Erkenntnis 59 (3):389 - 420.
I. Douven (2012). The Sequential Lottery Paradox. Analysis 72 (1):55-57.
Sharon Ryan (1996). The Epistemic Virtues of Consistency. Synthese 109 (2):121-141.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads36 ( #47,657 of 1,101,079 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #81,070 of 1,101,079 )
How can I increase my downloads?