Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326–345 (2007)
|Abstract||There is widespread agreement that we cannot know of a lottery ticket we own that it is a loser prior to the drawing of the lottery. At the same time we appear to have knowledge of events that will occur only if our ticket is a loser. Supposing any plausible closure principle for knowledge, the foregoing seems to yield a paradox. Appealing to some broadly Gricean insights, the present paper argues that this paradox is apparent only.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson (2006). Generalizing the Lottery Paradox. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.
Jennifer Nagel (2011). The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (5):1-28.
Sharon Ryan (1996). The Epistemic Virtues of Consistency. Synthese 109 (2):121-141.
Thomas Kroedel (2012). The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility. Analysis 72 (1):57-60.
Gregory Wheeler (2007). A Review of the Lottery Paradox. [REVIEW] In William Harper & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.
Donald Smith (2005). Knowledge and Lotteries. Philosophical Books 46 (2):123-131.
I. Douven (2012). The Sequential Lottery Paradox. Analysis 72 (1):55-57.
By Igor Douven (2008). The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204–225.
Igor Douven (2007). A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman's Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326-345.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #107,331 of 722,703 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,703 )
How can I increase my downloads?