David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 62 (1):47 - 69 (2005)
To save antirealism from Fitchs Paradox, Tennant has proposed to restrict the scope of the antirealist principle that all truths are knowable to truths that can be consistently assumed to be known. Although the proposal solves the paradox, it has been accused of doing so in an ad hoc manner. This paper argues that, first, for all Tennant has shown, the accusation is just; second, a restriction of the antirealist principle apparently weaker than Tennants yields a non-ad hoc solution to Fitchs Paradox; and third, the alternative is only apparently weaker than, and even provably equivalent to, Tennants. It is thereby shown that the latter is not ad hoc after all.
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Igor Douven (2009). Assertion, Moore, and Bayes. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361 - 375.
Igor Douven (2012). Learning Conditional Information. Mind and Language 27 (3):239-263.
Martin Fischer (2013). Some Remarks on Restricting the Knowability Principle. Synthese 190 (1):63-88.
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