Clarity about concessive knowledge attributions: reply to Dodd

Synthese 181 (3):395-403 (2011)
Abstract
Recently, Dylan Dodd (this Journal ) has tried to clear up what he takes to be some of the many confusions surrounding concessive knowledge attributions (CKAs)—i.e., utterances of the form “S knows that p , but it’s possible that q ” (where q entails not- p ) (Rysiew, Noûs 35(4): 477–514, 2001). Here, we respond to the criticisms Dodd offers of the account of the semantics and the sometime-infelicity of CKAs we have given (Dougherty and Rysiew, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(1): 121–132, 2009), showing both how Dodd misunderstands certain central features of that view and how the latter can, pace Dodd, be naturally extended to explain the oddity of those “For all I know” statements to which Dodd draws attention.
Keywords Concessive knowledge attributions  Fallibilism  Epistemic possibility  Epistemic modals  Scepticism
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References found in this work BETA
H. P. Grice (1988). The Causal Theory of Perception. In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Dylan Dodd (2011). Against Fallibilism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.
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