Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):281-309 (2005)
|Abstract||In this paper I discuss the rule of inference proposed by Kuipers under the name of Inference to the Best Theory. In particular, I argue that the rule needs to be strengthened if it is to serve realist purposes. I further describe a method for testing, and perhaps eventually justifying, a suitably strengthened version of it.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern & Moshe Y. Vardi (1992). What is an Inference Rule? Journal of Symbolic Logic 57 (3):1018-1045.
Bonnie Tamarkin Paller (1988). A Defense of a Non-Computational, Interactive Model of Visual Observation. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:135 - 142.
Adolfas Mackonis (2013). Inference to the Best Explanation, Coherence and Other Explanatory Virtues. Synthese 190 (6):975-995.
Christopher Gauker (1999). Deflationism and Logic. Facta Philosophica (1):167-199.
Yemima Ben-Menahem (1990). The Inference to the Best Explanation. Erkenntnis 33 (3):319-44.
Robert Pierson & Richard Reiner (2008). Explanatory Warrant for Scientific Realism. Synthese 161 (2):271 - 282.
Kareem Khalifa (2010). Default Privilege and Bad Lots: Underconsideration and Explanatory Inference. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):91 – 105.
Igor Douven (2002). Testing Inference to the Best Explanation. Synthese 130 (3):355 - 377.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #107,400 of 722,859 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,859 )
How can I increase my downloads?