Fricker on testimonial justification

Elizabeth Fricker has recently proposed a principle aimed at stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for testimonial justification. Her proposal entails that a hearer is justified in believing a speaker’s testimony only if she recognizes the speaker to be trustworthy, which, given Fricker’s internalist commitments, requires the hearer to have within her epistemic purview grounds which justify belief in the speaker’s trustworthiness. We argue that, as it stands, Fricker’s principle is too demanding, and we propose some amendments to it. We further discuss the viability of her internalist approach to testimony.Keywords: Testimony; Justification; Internalism; Social epistemology; Elizabeth Fricker
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.12.013
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Tyler Burge (1993). Content Preservation. Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Kourken Michaelian (2012). (Social) Metacognition and (Self-)Trust. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):481-514.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Patrick Bondy (2010). Argumentative Injustice. Informal Logic 30 (3):263-278.
Mikkel Gerken (2013). Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):532-557.
Deborah Tollefsen (2007). Group Testimony. Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

23 ( #128,632 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #369,877 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.