David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779 (2006)
This paper is concerned with formal solutions to the lottery paradox on which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. It considers some recently proposed solutions of this type and presents an argument showing that these solutions are trivial in that they boil down to the claim that perfect probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The argument is then generalized, showing that a broad class of similar solutions faces the same problem. An argument against some formal solutions to the lottery paradox The argument generalized Some variations Adding modalities Anticipated objections.
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Martin Smith (2010). What Else Justification Could Be. Noûs 44 (1):10 - 31.
Lara Buchak (2013). Belief, Credence, and Norms. Philosophical Studies 2:1-27.
Hannes Leitgeb (2013). Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.
Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp (2013). Proper Bootstrapping. Synthese 190 (1):171-185.
Kenny Easwaran (2015). Dr. Truthlove Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities. Noûs 50 (2):n/a-n/a.
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