Inductive risk and values in science

Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579 (2000)
Abstract
Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered in the internal stages of science: choice of methodology, characterization of data, and interpretation of results
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Citations of this work BETA
Gregor Betz (2013). In Defence of the Value Free Ideal. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):207-220.
Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik (2010). Why Science Cannot Be Value-Free. Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (1):33-41.
Justin Biddle (2013). State of the Field: Transient Underdetermination and Values in Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):124-133.

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