Inference to the best explanation made coherent

Philosophy of Science 66 (Supplement):S424-S435 (1999)
Van Fraassen (1989) argues that Inference to the Best Explanation is incoherent in the sense that adopting it as a rule for belief change will make one susceptible to a dynamic Dutch book. The present paper argues against this. A strategy is described that allows us to infer to the best explanation free of charge
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DOI 10.1086/392743
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A. Hajek (2008). Arguments for-or Against-Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.
Alan Hajek (2005). Scotching Dutch Books? Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):139-151.

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