Knowledge happens: Why Zagzebski has not solved the meno problem

Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):73-88 (2011)
I argue that Linda Zagzebski's proposed solution to the Meno Problem faces serious challenges. The Meno Problem, roughly, is how to explain the value that knowledge, as such, has over mere true belief. Her proposed solution is that believings—when thought of more like actions—can have value in virtue of their motivations. This meshes nicely with her theory that knowledge is, essentially, virtuously motivated true belief. Her solution fails because it entails that, necessarily, all knowledge is motivated in a way that resembles the motivation of actions. Crucially, Zagzebski says the value derived from motivation comes from certain laudable feelings—like love of truth (she is explicit that love is a feeling). But there are possible cases of knowledge—probably some of which are actual—in which subjects do not or cannot experience these feelings
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    References found in this work BETA
    William P. Alston (2000). Virtue and Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):185-189.
    Jason S. Baehr (2006). Character in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):479--514.
    Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.

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