David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 27 (3):239-263 (2012)
Some of the information we receive comes to us in an explicitly conditional form. It is an open question how to model the accommodation of such information in a Bayesian framework. This paper presents data suggesting that there may be no strictly Bayesian account of updating on conditionals. Specifically, the data seem to indicate that such updating at least sometimes proceeds on the basis of explanatory considerations, which famously have no home in standard Bayesian epistemology. The paper also proposes a still broadly Bayesian model of updating on conditionals that explicitly factors in explanation. The model is shown to have clear empirical content and thus to be open to empirical testing
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References found in this work BETA
Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (2007). Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning. OUP Oxford.
Peter Lipton (2004). Inference to the Best Explanation. Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
Jonathan Bennett (2003). A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
David Lewis (1986). Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Niki Pfeifer & Igor Douven (2013). Formal Epistemology and the New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning. Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2):1-23.
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