Metaphilosophy and Free Will

Oxford University Press (1996)
Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? In this broad and stimulating look at the philosophical enterprise, Richard Double uses the free will controversy to build on the subjectivist conclusion he developed in The Non-Reality of Free Will (OUP 1991). Double argues that various views about free will--e.g., compatibilism, incompatibilism, and even subjectivism--are compelling if, and only if, we adopt supporting metaphilosophical views. Because metaphilosophical considerations are not provable, we cannot show any free will theory to be most reasonable. Metaphilosophy and Free Will deconstructs the free will problem and, by example, challenges philosophers in other areas to show how their philosophical argumentation can succeed.
Keywords Belief  Choice  Ethics  Free Will  Freedom  Goodness  Metaphilosophy  Morality  Subjectivism
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Call number BJ1468.5.D68 1996
ISBN(s) 0195107624   9780195107623  
DOI 10.2307/2653575
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Tamler Sommers (2009). More Work for Hard Incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.
Steven Rieber (2006). Free Will and Contextualism. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):223 - 252.
Richard Double (2004). The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):411-422.

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