Graduate studies at Western
Erkenntnis 67 (1):111 - 118 (2007)
|Abstract||Bradley has argued that a truth-conditional semantics for conditionals is incompatible with an allegedly very weak and intuitively compelling constraint on the interpretation of conditionals. I argue that the example Bradley offers to motivate this constraint can be explained along pragmatic lines that are compatible with the correctness of at least one popular truth-conditional semantics for conditionals.|
|Keywords||Conditionals Bradley Adams’s Thesis Pragmatics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Richard Bradley (2000). Conditionals and the Logic of Decision. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):32.
Frank Döring (1997). The Ramsey Test and Conditional Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):359-376.
Richard Bradley (2006). Adams Conditionals and Non-Monotonic Probabilities. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):65-81.
Daniel Rothschild (2013). Do Indicative Conditionals Express Propositions? Noûs 47 (1):49-68.
Richard Bradley (2002). Indicative Conditionals. Erkenntnis 56 (3):345-378.
Michela Ippolito (2006). Semantic Composition and Presupposition Projection in Subjunctive Conditionals. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (6):631 - 672.
Frank Jackson (ed.) (1991). Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
Hannes Leitgeb (2007). Beliefs in Conditionals Vs. Conditional Beliefs. Topoi 26 (1):115-132.
Richard Bradley (2000). A Preservation Condition for Conditionals. Analysis 60 (3):219–222.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads10 ( #114,394 of 722,936 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 722,936 )
How can I increase my downloads?