Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):38-63 (2010)
|Abstract||Until now, antirealists have offered sketches of a theory of truth, at best. In this paper, we present a probabilist account of antirealist truth in some formal detail, and we assess its ability to deal with the problems that are standardly taken to beset antirealism.|
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