Proper bootstrapping

Synthese 190 (1):171-185 (2013)
According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type of reasoning suffices to block the anti-reliabilist argument
Keywords Confirmation theory  Bootstrapping  Easy knowledge
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0115-x
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References found in this work BETA
Clark Glymour (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton University Press.
Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Stewart Cohen (2002). Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
Jonathan Vogel (2000). Reliabilism Leveled. Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Weisberg (2010). Bootstrapping in General. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525 - 548.

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Sam Mitchell (1995). Toward a Defensible Bootstrapping. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):241-260.
Jonathan Weisberg (2010). Bootstrapping in General. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525 - 548.
David Grünberg (2001). Bootstrapping and the Problem of Testing Quantitative Theoretical Hypotheses. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2001:143-150.
Alison Wylie (1986). Bootstrapping in Un-Natural Sciences: Archaeological Theory Testing. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:314 - 321.

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