David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 56 (June):163-73 (1989)
The objection to R-S accounts that was raised by the possibility of external agents requires the acceptance of two premises, viz., that all R-S accounts allow for puppeteers and that puppeteers necessarily make us unfree. The Metaphilosophical reply shows that to the extent that puppeteers are more problematic than determinism per se, pup-peteers may be explicitly excluded since they violate our paradigm of free will. The Metaphilosophical reply also suggests that we should not expect our mature R-S account to supply logically necessary and sufficient conditions for free will, but rather give us answers that agree with our intuitions regarding paradigms of free and unfree decisions. The Irrelevancy reply completed our reply to incompatibilists who continue to object that determinism per se destroys the R-S program. It may be debated whether my autonomy variable account is a satisfactory way to spell out the Irrelevancy reply, but I think that this type of approach suggests the way to vindicating the R-S view from an important type of objection
|Keywords||Compatibilism Decision Free Will Metaphysics Reason|
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
John Martin Fischer (ed.) (1986). Moral Responsibility. Cornell University Press.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Robert H. Kane (1985). Free Will and Values. SUNY Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Richard Double (1988). Libertarianism and Rationality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):431-439.
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