Putnam’s Model-Theoretic Argument Reconstructed

Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):479-490 (1999)
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Abstract

Putnam's model theoretic argument against metaphysical realism can be reconstructed as valid, with premises acceptable to the realist. There is no illegitimate assumption that the causal theory of reference is false.

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Igor Douven
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Citations of this work

On Putnam and his models.Timothy Bays - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (7):331-350.
Two arguments against realism.Timothy Bays - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):193–213.
The Putnam-Goodman-Kripke Paradox.Robert Kowalenko - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):575-594.
On the Referential Indeterminacy of Logical and Mathematical Concepts.Otávio Bueno - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):65 - 79.

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