Quantum probabilities and the conjunction principle

Synthese 184 (1):109-114 (2012)
A recent argument by Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio purports to show that we can uphold the principle that competently forming conjunctions is a knowledge-preserving operation only at the cost of a rampant skepticism about the future. A key premise of their argument is that, in light of quantum-mechanical considerations, future contingents never quite have chance 1 of being true. We argue, by drawing attention to the order of magnitude of the relevant quantum probabilities, that the skeptical threat of Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio’s argument is illusory
Keywords Quantum probabilities  Conjunction principle  Skepticism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9693-7
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References found in this work BETA
Igor Douven (2009). Assertion, Moore, and Bayes. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361 - 375.
Igor Douven (2007). A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman's Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326-345.

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