David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):534-547 (2012)
Abstract: This paper argues that instances of what are typically called ‘epistemic irresponsibility’ are better understood as instances of moral or prudenial failure. This hypothesis covers the data and is simpler than postulating a new sui generis form of normativitiy. The irresponsibility alleged is that embeded in charges of ‘You should have known better!’ However, I argue, either there is some interest at stake in knowing or there is not. If there is not, then there is no irresponsibility. If there is, it is either the inquirer's interests—in which case it is a prudential shortcoming—or someone else's interests are at stake—in which case it is a moral shortcoming. In no case, I argue, is there any need to postulate a form of normativity in epistemology other than the traditional epistemological norm that one's attitudes should fit the evidence one has.
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References found in this work BETA
Aristotle (2012). Nicomachean Ethics. Courier Dover Publications.
Linda Zagzebski (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
David Christensen (2007). Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News. Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.
Gilbert Harman (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono (2016). The Ethics of Delusional Belief. Erkenntnis 81 (2):275-296.
Sanford C. Goldberg (forthcoming). Should Have Known. Synthese:1-32.
Trent Dougherty & Chris Tweedt (2015). Religious Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 10 (8):547-559.
Scott Stapleford (2015). Epistemic Versus All Things Considered Requirements. Synthese 192 (6):1861-1881.
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