Realizing Virtue: A Unified Virtue Epistemology

In this paper I will offer a sketch of an account of knowledge which seeks to unify a number of disparate elements the inclusion of which I assume to be a desideratum of a theory of knowledge. The device I will utilize to achieve this unity-in-diversity is that of a functional property—a property multiply realizable in widely varying realization bases. The essential idea is that the property warrant is a functional property: that which epistemizes true belief, that which turns mere true belief into knowledge. The ability of functional properties to be realized in diverse ways provides the flexibility to bring together all the items we want to fall under the concept knowledge . I will attempt to illustrate this for some key desiderata. ***Please note this is a draft shortened for APA purposes. The longer paper includes a defense of the propriety of the desiderata
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