Similarity After Goodman

In a famous critique, Goodman dismissed similarity as a slippery and both philosophically and scientifically useless notion. We revisit his critique in the light of important recent work on similarity in psychology and cognitive science. Specifically, we use Tversky’s influential set-theoretic account of similarity as well as Gärdenfors’s more recent resuscitation of the geometrical account to show that, while Goodman’s critique contained valuable insights, it does not warrant a dismissal of similarity
Keywords Philosophy   Neurosciences   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Philosophy of Science   Developmental Psychology   Cognitive Psychology
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DOI 10.1007/s13164-010-0035-y
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Arianna Betti & Hein van den Berg (2014). Modelling the History of Ideas. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (4):812-835.

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