The anti-realist argument for underdetermination

Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):371-375 (2000)
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Abstract

Typically, anti-realists argue for the underdetermination of theory by the data on the basis of the claim that each theory has empirically equivalent rivals. Leplin has recently sought to show that, whatever the truth-value of this latter claim, it cannot play any positive role in an argument for underdetermination. I argue that Leplin’s attempt fails.

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Igor Douven
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Citations of this work

The miraculous choice argument for realism.Eric Barnes - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 111 (2):97 - 120.
Empirical equivalence, explanatory force, and the inference to the best theory.Igor Douven - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):281-309.
A Davidsonian argument against incommensurability.Igor Douven & Henk W. De Regt - 2002 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):157 – 169.

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References found in this work

Underdetermination, Realism, and Reason.John Earman - 1993 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):19-38.
The Scientific Image.Bas C. Fraassen - 1983 - Mind 92 (366):291-293.

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