David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behaviorism 15 (2):131-39 (1987)
A distinction between the use of computational models in cognitive science and a philosophically inspired reductivist thesis is developed. PF is found questionable for phenomenal states, and, by analogy, dubious for the nonphenomenal introspectible mental states of common sense. PF is also shown to be threatened for the sub-cognitive theoretical states of cognitive science by the work of the so-called New Connectionists. CMM is shown to be less vulnerable to these criticisms
|Keywords||Cognitive Computational Complexity Functionalism Metaphysics Minds Model|
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