The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing that Intentions are Irrelevant to Permissibility

Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (1):51-70 (2009)
I attempt to describe the several costs that criminal theory would be forced to pay by adopting the view (currently fashionable among moral philosophers) that the intentions of the agent are irrelevant to determinations of whether his actions are permissible (or criminal)
Keywords Law   Philosophy   Ethics   Criminal Law   Philosophy of Law   Law Theory/Law Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11572-008-9065-2
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,974
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Deborah Hellman (2009). Willfully Blind for Good Reason. Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (3):301-316.
Douglas Husak (2010). Mistake of Law and Culpability. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (2):135-159.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

15 ( #172,076 of 1,725,870 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #210,637 of 1,725,870 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.