The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing that Intentions are Irrelevant to Permissibility

Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (1):51-70 (2009)
I attempt to describe the several costs that criminal theory would be forced to pay by adopting the view (currently fashionable among moral philosophers) that the intentions of the agent are irrelevant to determinations of whether his actions are permissible (or criminal)
Keywords Law   Philosophy   Ethics   Criminal Law   Philosophy of Law   Law Theory/Law Philosophy
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
R. A. Duff (2006). Answering for Crime. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):85–111.
Jeremy Horder (1996). Crimes of Ulterior Intent. In A. P. Simester & A. T. H. Smith (eds.), Harm and Culpability. Oxford University Press 153--68.

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Citations of this work BETA
Deborah Hellman (2009). Willfully Blind for Good Reason. Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (3):301-316.
Douglas Husak (2010). Mistake of Law and Culpability. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (2):135-159.
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