Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (1):51-70 (2009)
|Abstract||I attempt to describe the several costs that criminal theory would be forced to pay by adopting the view (currently fashionable among moral philosophers) that the intentions of the agent are irrelevant to determinations of whether his actions are permissible (or criminal)|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
R. A. Duff (2010). Towards a Theory of Criminal Law? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):1-28.
Neil Levy (2012). Skepticism and Sanction: The Benefits of Rejecting Moral Responsibility. Law and Philosophy 31 (5):477-493.
Douglas Husak (2008). Why Criminal Law: A Question of Content? Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (2):99-122.
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2012). Intentions and Discrimination in Hiring. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (1):55-74.
Michael S. Moore (1993). Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its Implications for Criminal Law. Oxford University Press.
Jakob Elster (2012). Scanlon on Permissibility and Double Effect. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (1):75-102.
Alec D. Walen (2008). Comments on Doug Husak: The Low Cost of Recognizing (and of Ignoring) the Limited Relevance of Intentions to Permissibility. Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (1):71-78.
Douglas N. Husak (2010). The Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads9 ( #115,463 of 556,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #39,010 of 556,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?