David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):411-422 (2004)
Adopting meta-level Free Will Subjectivism is one among several ways to maintain that persons never experience moral freedom in their choices. The other ways of arguing against moral freedom I consider are presented by Saul Smilansky, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom. In this paper, without arguing for the acceptance of free will subjectivism, I argue that subjectivism has some moral and theoretical advantages over its kindred theories
|Keywords||Ethics Free Will Freedom Morality Subjectivism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Derk Pereboom (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (1995). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press.
John Jamieson Carswell Smart & Bernard Williams (1973). Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press.
Saul Smilansky (2000). Free Will and Illusion. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jonathan Cohen (2001). Subjectivism, Physicalism or None of the Above? Comments on Ross's The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):94-104.
Peter W. Ross (2001). The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):42-58.
By Ira M. Schnall (2004). Philosophy of Language and Meta-Ethics. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):587–594.
Roger White (2007). Epistemic Subjectivism. Episteme 4 (1):115-129.
John Martin Fischer (2004). Free Will and Moral Responsibility. In D. Copps (ed.), Handbook on Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press
Sebastian Köhler (2012). Expressivism, Subjectivism and Moral Disagreement. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):71-78.
Richard Double (2002). Metaethics, Metaphilosophy, and Free Will Subjectivism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press
Galen Strawson (1986). Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press.
Richard Double (1996). Metaphilosophy and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads100 ( #41,619 of 1,911,368 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #177,396 of 1,911,368 )
How can I increase my downloads?