David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 164 (1):19-44 (2008)
According to so-called epistemic theories of conditionals, the assertability/acceptability/acceptance of a conditional requires the existence of an epistemically significant relation between the conditional’s antecedent and its consequent. This paper points to some linguistic data that our current best theories of the foregoing type appear unable to explain. Further, it presents a new theory of the same type that does not have that shortcoming. The theory is then defended against some seemingly obvious objections.
|Keywords||Conditionals Probability Semantics Bayesian epistemology|
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References found in this work BETA
H. P. Grice (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press.
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
Jonathan Bennett (2003). A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Citations of this work BETA
Niels Skovgaard‐Olsen (2015). Ranking Theory and Conditional Reasoning. Cognitive Science 40 (1).
Igor Douven (forthcoming). How to Account for the Oddness of Missing-Link Conditionals. Synthese:1-14.
Karolina Krzyżanowska, Sylvia Wenmackers & Igor Douven (2014). Rethinking Gibbard's Riverboat Argument. Studia Logica 102 (4):771-792.
Niki Pfeifer & Igor Douven (2013). Formal Epistemology and the New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning. Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2):1-23.
Igor Douven (2012). The Lottery Paradox and the Pragmatics of Belief. Dialectica 66 (3):351-373.
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