David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204–225 (2008)
Many have the intuition that the right response to the Lottery Paradox is to deny that one can justifiably believe of even a single lottery ticket that it will lose. The paper shows that from any theory of justification that solves the paradox in accordance with this intuition, a theory not of that kind can be derived that also solves the paradox but is more conducive to our epistemic goal than the former. It is argued that currently there is no valid reason not to give preference to the derived accounts over the accounts from which they come.
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References found in this work BETA
Edmund Gettier (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
Keith Lehrer (2000). Theory of Knowledge. Westview Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Moti Mizrahi (2012). Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ From an Epistemic Point of View? Philosophia 40 (4):829-840.
Igor Douven (2009). Assertion, Moore, and Bayes. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361 - 375.
Anandi Hattiangadi (2010). The Love of Truth. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):422-432.
Igor Douven (2010). Simulating Peer Disagreements. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):148-157.
Glenn Ross (2012). Reconsidering the Lessons of the Lottery for Knowledge and Belief. Philosophical Studies 161 (1):37-46.
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