The preface paradox revisited

Erkenntnis 59 (3):389 - 420 (2003)
The Preface Paradox has led many philosophers to believe that, if it isassumed that high probability is necessary for rational acceptability, the principleaccording to which rational acceptability is closed under conjunction (CP)must be abandoned. In this paper we argue that the paradox is far less damaging to CP than is generally believed. We describe how, given certain plausibleassumptions, in a large class of cases in which CP seems to lead tocontradiction, it does not do so after all. A restricted version of CP canthus be maintained.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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Igor Douven (2009). Assertion, Moore, and Bayes. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361 - 375.
Brian Kim (2015). This Paper Surely Contains Some Errors. Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1013-1029.

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