The Sequential Lottery Paradox

Analysis 72 (1):55-57 (2012)
Abstract
The Lottery Paradox is generally thought to point at a conflict between two intuitive principles, to wit, that high probability is sufficient for rational acceptability, and that rational acceptability is closed under logical derivability. Gilbert Harman has offered a solution to the Lottery Paradox that allows one to stick to both of these principles. The solution requires the principle that acceptance licenses conditionalization. The present study shows that adopting this principle alongside the principle that high probability is sufficient for rational acceptability gives rise to another paradox
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    References found in this work BETA
    Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson (2006). Generalizing the Lottery Paradox. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.
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