Unger's argument for skepticism revisited

Theoria 74 (3):239-250 (2008)
Abstract
Unger (1974/2000) presents an argument for skepticism that significantly differs from the more traditional arguments for skepticism. The argument is based on two premises, to wit, that knowledge would entitle the knower to absolute certainty, and that an attitude of absolute certainty is always inadmissible from an epistemic viewpoint. The present paper scrutinizes the arguments that Unger provides in support of these premises and shows that none of them is tenable. It thus concludes that Unger's argument for skepticism fails to threaten the possibility of knowledge.
Keywords Unger  certainty  epistemology  skepticism
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (2006). The Scope and Limits of Human Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):159 – 166.
L. S. Carrier (1983). Skepticism Disarmed. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):107 - 114.

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