Graduate studies at Western
Theoria 74 (3):239-250 (2008)
|Abstract||Unger (1974/2000) presents an argument for skepticism that significantly differs from the more traditional arguments for skepticism. The argument is based on two premises, to wit, that knowledge would entitle the knower to absolute certainty, and that an attitude of absolute certainty is always inadmissible from an epistemic viewpoint. The present paper scrutinizes the arguments that Unger provides in support of these premises and shows that none of them is tenable. It thus concludes that Unger's argument for skepticism fails to threaten the possibility of knowledge.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Paul Silva (2013). Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589.
Stephen Maitzen (2006). The Impossibility of Local Skepticism. Philosophia 34 (4):453-464.
Baron Reed (2009). A New Argument for Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):91 - 104.
Manuel Vargas (2004). Libertarianism and Skepticism About Free Will: Some Arguments Against Both. Philosophical Topics 32 (1&2):403-26.
Anthony L. Brueckner (1986). Brains in a Vat. Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.
Peter K. Unger (1975/2002). Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford University Press.
Paul Oppenheimer & Ralf Meerbote (1980). The Certainty of Skepticism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:125-128.
Dylan Dodd (2012). Evidentialism and Skeptical Arguments. Synthese 189 (2):337-352.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads60 ( #19,404 of 751,029 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #62,995 of 751,029 )
How can I increase my downloads?