Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):125-30 (1984)
|Abstract||It has been proposed that the law of non-contradiction be revised to permit the simultaneous truth and falsity of the key sentences of the logical paradoxes, e.g., This sentence is false. In an attempt to show to what extent this bizarre suggestion of inconsistent models or truth-value gluts is a coherent suggestion it is proved that a first-order language for number theory can be semantically closed by having its own global truth predicate under some non-standard interpretation and thus that it actually can contain the Liar sentence. It is proved that in this interpretation the Liar sentence is both true and false, although not every sentence is.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Francesco Berto & Graham Priest (2008). Dialetheism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008).
Gregor Damschen (2008). This is Nonsense. The Reasoner 2 (10):6-8.
Jason Zarri (2010). A Dilemma for Dialetheism. The Dualist 15 (Spring):21-31.
Dale Jacquette (2007). Denying The Liar. Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):91-98.
Patrick Greenough (2011). Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):547-563.
Christopher Gauker (2006). Against Stepping Back: A Critique of Contextualist Approaches to the Semantic Paradoxes. Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (4):393 - 422.
J. C. Beall (ed.) (2007). Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Alexandre Billon (2011). My Own Truth ---Pathologies of Self-Reference and Relative Truth. In Rahman Shahid, Primiero Giuseppe & Marion Mathieu (eds.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, Vol. 23. springer.
Matt Leonard (2012). Burge's Contextual Theory of Truth and the Super-Liar Paradox. In Michal Pelis Vit Puncochar (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2011. College Publications.
Bradley Dowden, Liar Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads31 ( #39,385 of 549,628 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,628 )
How can I increase my downloads?