Absences, Possible Causation, and the Problem of Non-Locality

The Monist 92 (1):23-40 (2009)
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Abstract

I argue that so-called ‘absence causation’must be treated in terms of counterfactuals about causation such as ‘had a occurred, a would have caused b’. First, I argue that some theories of causation that accept absence causation are unattractive because they undermine the idea of possible causation. And second, I argue that accepting absence causation violates a principle commonly associated with relativity.

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Phil Dowe
Australian National University

Citations of this work

Being Positive About Negative Facts.Mark Jago & Stephen Barker - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.
Relativity and the Causal Efficacy of Abstract Objects.Tim Juvshik - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3):269-282.
Counterfactual theories of causation.Peter Menzies - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What is an omission?Randolph Clarke - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):127-143.

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