David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):93 – 111 (2008)
One strategy for blocking Chalmers's overall case against physicalism has been to deny his claim that showing that phenomenal properties are in some sense physical requires an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones. Here I avoid this well-trodden ground and argue instead that an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones does not require an analysis in the Jackson/Chalmers sense. This is to sever the dualist's link between conceptual analysis and a priori entailment by showing that the lack of the former does not imply the absence of the latter. Moreover, given the role of the argument from conceptual analysis in Chalmers's overall case for dualism, undermining that argument effectively undermines that case as a whole in a way that, I'll argue, undermining the conceivability arguments as stand-alone arguments does not.
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.
David J. Chalmers (2004). Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics. Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):153-226.
David J. Chalmers (2004). Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):182-90.
David J. Chalmers (1999). Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):473-96.
David J. Chalmers (ed.) (2002). Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Adrian Boutel (2013). How to Be a Type-C Physicalist. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):301-320.
Janice Dowell, J. L. (2008). Serious Metaphysics and the Vindication of Reductions. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):91 - 110.
Janice Dowell (2008). Serious Metaphysics and the Vindication of Reductions. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):91 - 110.
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