David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge (2004)
In this paper I reconsider a standard counterexample to the chance-raising theory of singular causation. Extant versions of this theory are so different that it is difficult to formulate the core thesis that they all share, despite the guiding idea that causes raise the chance of their effects. At one extreme, ‘Humean’ theories – which can be traced to Reichenbach – say that a particular event of type C is the cause of a particular event of type E only if P(E|C & K) > P(E|~C & K) where K is a set of background conditions and where the probabilities are interpreted as relative frequencies. At the other extreme, explicitly non-Humean theories take chance to be a physical, particular, local feature of the world.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert Northcott (2010). Natural-Born Deterministe: A New Defense of Causation as Probability-Raising. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):1 - 20.
Similar books and articles
Roberta L. Millstein (2000). Chance and Macroevolution. Philosophy of Science 67 (4):603-624.
Antony Eagle, Chance Versus Randomness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Jonathan Schaffer (2003). Principled Chances. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):27-41.
Pascal Massie (2003). The Irony of Chance. International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):15-28.
Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.) (2004). Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Deterministic Chance? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):113 - 140.
Toby Handfield (2012). A Philosophical Guide to Chance: Physical Probability. Cambridge University Press.
Phil Dowe (2003). A Dilemma for Objective Chance. In Jr Kyburg & Mariam Thalos (eds.), Probability is the Very Guide of Life: The Philosophical Uses of Chance. Open Court. 153--64.
Christopher Hitchcock (2004). Routes, Processes, and Chance-Lowering Causes. In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
Phil Dowe (1999). The Conserved Quantity Theory of Causation and Chance Raising. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):501.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?