David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Economics and Philosophy 23 (2):141-162 (2007)
Recent theories of negative freedom see it as a value-neutral concept; the definition of freedom should not be in terms of specific moral values. Specifically, preferences or desires do not enter into the definition of freedom. If preferences should so enter then Berlin's problem that a person may enhance their freedom by changing their preferences emerges. This paper demonstrates that such a preference-free conception brings its own counter-intuitive problems. It concludes that these problems might be avoided if the description of the constraints which specify an agent's lack of freedom include the intentions of those who constrain the agents. (Published Online July 31 2007) Footnotes1 Versions of this paper have been read to a diverse set of academics in Bayreuth, Germany; Groningen, Netherlands; LSE, UK; and in Dublin, Ireland. We would like to thank participants at those sessions for their comments. We also thank anonymous referees, Ian Carter and Luc Bovens for their help in improving the paper.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Garnett (2016). Value Neutrality and the Ranking of Opportunity Sets. Economics and Philosophy 32 (1):99-119.
Ian Carter & Matthew H. Kramer (2008). How Changes in One's Preferences Can Affect One's Freedom (and How They Cannot): A Reply to Dowding and Van Hees. Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):81-96.
Rutger Claassen (2014). Capability Paternalism. Economics and Philosophy 30 (1):57-73.
Frank Hindriks (2008). The Freedom of Collective Agents. Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2):165–183.
Benjamin Franks (2008). Power, Capability and Ableness: The Fallacy of the Vehicle Fallacy. Contemporary Political Theory 7 (3):238-258.
Similar books and articles
Keith Lehrer (1997). Freedom, Preference and Autonomy. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):3-25.
Matthew H. Kramer (2003). On the Counterfactual Dimension of Negative Liberty. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 2 (1):63-92.
Ian Hunt (2001). Overall Freedom and Constraint. Inquiry 44 (2):131 – 147.
Maria Dimova-Cookson (2003). A New Scheme of Positive and Negative Freedom: Reconstructing T. H. Green on Freedom. Political Theory 31 (4):508-532.
Martin van Hees (2003). Acting Autonomously Versus Not Acting Heteronomously. Theory and Decision 54 (4):337-355.
K. Dowding (2011). Republican Freedom, Rights, and the Coalition Problem. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (3):301-322.
Martin van Hees (1998). On the Analysis of Negative Freedom. Theory and Decision 45 (2):175-197.
Mari Stenlund (2011). Involuntary Antipsychotic Medication and Freedom of Thought. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 4 (2):31-33.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads26 ( #148,263 of 1,902,049 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #281,247 of 1,902,049 )
How can I increase my downloads?