Formulating the thesis of physicalism

Philosophical Studies 131 (1):1-23 (2006)
Perhaps more controversial than whether physicalism is true is what exactly would have to be true for physicalism to be true. Everyone agrees that, intuitively at least, physicalism is the thesis that there is nothing over and above the physical. The disagreements arise in how to get beyond this intuitive formulation. Until about ten years ago, participants in this debate were concerned primarily with answering two questions. First, what is it for a property, kind, relation, or individual to be a physical one?
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Logic   Epistemology   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.2307/25471797
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