Philosophical Studies 131 (1):1-23 (2006)
|Abstract||Perhaps more controversial than whether physicalism is true is what exactly would have to be true for physicalism to be true. Everyone agrees that, intuitively at least, physicalism is the thesis that there is nothing over and above the physical. The disagreements arise in how to get beyond this intuitive formulation. Until about ten years ago, participants in this debate were concerned primarily with answering two questions. First, what is it for a property, kind, relation, or individual to be a physical one?|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Daniel Stoljar (2001). Two Conceptions of the Physical. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253 - 281.
Daniel Stoljar (2001). Two Conceptions of the Physical. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-81.
J. L. Dowell (2006). The Physical: Empirical, Not Metaphysical. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):25-60.
Benedikt Paul Göcke (2009). What is Physicalism? Ratio 22 (3):291-307.
Neal Judisch (2008). Why 'Non-Mental' Won't Work: On Hempel's Dilemma and the Characterization of the 'Physical'. Philosophical Studies 140 (3):299 - 318.
Noa Latham (2003). What is Token Physicalism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):270-290.
Janice Dowell (2006). Formulating the Thesis of Physicalism: An Introduction. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):1-23.
Warren Shrader (2008). On the Relevance of Supervenience Theses to Physicalism. Acta Analytica 23 (3):257-271.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads64 ( #14,686 of 556,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?