Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2001)
|Abstract||The Liar Paradox is an argument that arrives at a contradiction by reasoning about a Liar Sentence. The classical Liar Sentence is the self-referential sentence “This sentence is false.”|
|Keywords||Tarski global truth predicate Kripke Quine Russell Barwise Etchemendy Strengthened Liar|
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