Serious metaphysics and the vindication of reductions

Philosophical Studies 139 (1):91 - 110 (2008)
What would be sufficient to show of some apparently higher-level property that it is 'nothing over and above' some complex configuration of more basic properties? This paper defends a new method for justifying reductions by demonstrating its comparative advantages over two methods recently defended in the literature. Unlike its rivals, what I'll call "the semantic method" makes a reduction's truth epistemically transparent without relying on conceptual analyses
Keywords Physicalism  Dualism  Reduction  Conceptual analysis  Inference to the best explanation
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DOI 10.2307/40208893
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Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.

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