The political economy of central banking

Critical Review 8 (1):49-60 (1994)
Abstract
In Monetary Sovereignty: The Political Economy of Central Banking in Western Europe, John Goodman argues that the experience of central banking in Germany, France, and Italy illustrates the importance of the degree of central bank independence from the political authorities, and that inflation was lower in Germany in large part because of the Bundesbank's greater independence. These conclusions are very similar to those reached in the economics literature. But the Bundesbank's record is not as impressive as Goodman suggests, and the failure of central banks to eliminate inflation has been extremely costly to western economies.
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