David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 131 (1):25-60 (2006)
2. The Contingency and A posteriority Constraint: A formulation of the thesis must make physicalism come out contingent and a posteriori. First, physicalism is a contingent truth, if it is a truth. This means that physicalism could have been false, i.e. there are counterfactual worlds in which physicalism is false, for example, counterfactual worlds in which there are <span class='Hi'>miracle</span>-performing angels. Moreover, if physicalism is true, our knowledge of its truth is a posteriori. This is to say that there are ways the world could turn out to be such that physicalism is false. For example, if there are <span class='Hi'>miracle</span>-performing angels, then physicalism is false. So there are worlds considered as actual in which physicalism is false. For short, call this ‘the a posteriority constraint’..
|Keywords||Constraint Content Contingency Metaphysics Physicalism Scientific Realism|
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Jessica M. Wilson (2006). On Characterizing the Physical. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99.
Raphaël Fiorese (forthcoming). Stoljar’s Dilemma and Three Conceptions of the Physical: A Defence of the Via Negativa. Erkenntnis:1-29.
Alyssa Ney (2008). Defining Physicalism. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1033-1048.
Janice Dowell, J. L. (2008). Empirical Metaphysics: The Role of Intuitions About Possible Cases in Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 140 (1):19 - 46.
Robert J. Howell (2009). The Ontology of Subjective Physicalism. Noûs 43 (2):315-345.
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