Would‐cause semantics

Philosophy of Science 76 (5):701-711 (2009)
This article raises two difficulties that certain approaches to causation have with would‐cause counterfactuals. First, there is a problem with David Lewis’s semantics of counterfactuals when we ‘suppose in’ some positive event of a certain kind. And, second, there is a problem with embedded counterfactuals. I show that causal‐modeling approaches do not have these problems. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland 4072, Australia; e‐mail: p.dowe@uq.edu.au.
Keywords Causation   Nonlocality   Preemption  2203 Philosophy
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DOI 10.1086/605796
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Jonathan Schaffer (2005). Contrastive Causation. Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.
P. Dowe (2001). A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and 'Causation' by Omission. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):216 – 226.

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