A Challenge for Lowe and Ellis' Differentiation of Kinds as Substantive Universals

Erkenntnis 78 (1):73 - 94 (2013)
Abstract
I question here the differentiation of kinds as substantive universals in Lowe and Ellis' metaphysics, by taking up, for the argument's sake, two extreme approaches on kind differentiation and kind change, a Heraclitan and a Spinozan approach. I show that, as things currently stand, Heraclitanism or Spinozism about kinds is consistent with the broad tenets of Lowe and Ellis' metaphysics of kinds
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References found in this work BETA
George Botterill (2005). Scientific Essentialism. Philosophical Books 46 (2):118-122.

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