David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (5):347-369 (2010)
In this paper, I focus on life-threatening medical conditions and argue that from the point of view of natural properties, induction(s), and participation in laws, at least some of the ill organisms dealt with in somatic medicine form natural kinds in the same sense in which the kinds in the exact sciences are thought of as natural. By way of comparing two ‘divisions of nature’, viz., a ‘classical’ exact science kind (gold) and a kind of disease (Graves disease), I show that there is no justifiable ‘ontological gap’ between disease kinds and exact sciences kinds. We have instead a difference of degree
|Keywords||Natural kinds Medical kinds Special sciences Causation Induction Natural law|
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References found in this work BETA
Nathan U. Salmon (2005). Reference and Essence. Prometheus Books.
Nancy Cartwright (1999). The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge University Press.
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
John Dupré (1993). The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Harvard University Press.
B. D. Ellis (2001). Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Alexandra Pârvan (2015). Patients' Substantialization of Disease, the Hybrid Symptom Andmetaphysical Care. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 21 (3):380-388.
Peter Hucklenbroich (2014). “Disease Entity” as the Key Theoretical Concept of Medicine. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (6):609-633.
Marco Antonio Azevedo (2015). Health as a Clinic-Epidemiological Concept. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 21 (3):365-373.
Stefan Dragulinescu (2012). On Anti Humeanism and Medical Singular Causation. Acta Analytica 27 (3):265-292.
Alexandra Pârvan (forthcoming). Monistic Dualism and the Body Electric: An Ontology of Disease, Patient and Clinician for Person-Centred Healthcare. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice.
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