Evidence without Priors
Philo 13 (1):18-22 (2010)
| Abstract | I argue that it is possible to acquire evidence that has no probability, not even zero, prior to its acquisition. If I am right then, contrary to certain Bayesian models of confirmation, conditionalization is not the only possible basis upon which a rational agent will alter her credence in some hypothesis in response to new evidence. My conclusion follows from certain analyses of the Sleeping Beauty problem. Because those analyses are controversial, however, I alter the Sleeping Beauty scenario to generate an obvious example of evidence that has no prior probability | |||||||||
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Kai Draper (forthcoming). The Evidential Relevance of Self-Locating Information. Philosophical Studies.
Berry Groisman (2008). The End of Sleeping Beauty's Nightmare. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):409-416.
Kai Draper (2008). Sleeping Beauty's Evidence. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):61 - 70.
Karl Karlander & Levi Spectre (2010). Sleeping Beauty Meets Monday. Synthese 174 (3).
Gregory Wheeler & Richard Scheines (forthcoming). Coherence and Confirmation Through Causation. Mind.
Gregory Wheeler & Richard Scheines (forthcoming). Coherence and Confirmation Through Causation. Mind.
Paul D. Thorn (forthcoming). Defeasible Conditionalization. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-20.
Joel Pust (2008). Horgan on Sleeping Beauty. Synthese 160 (1):97 - 101.
Peter Achinstein (1994). Stronger Evidence. Philosophy of Science 61 (3):329-350.
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