The Fine-Tuning Argument Revisited
Philo 3 (2):38 - 49 (2000)
| Abstract | A version of the fine-tuning argument (FTA) considered in a previous essay is replaced by an improved version, which is then refuted. Advocates of FTA must proclaim that there is no world ensemble, that a great many alternatives to the physical constants of our universe are physically possible and roughly equal in probability to them, and that alternate hypothetical worlds are all, or almost all, uninteresting in comparison to our universe. But no reason has been produced to believe ’any’ of these claims, and so FTA, even in its improved version, can still be dismissed as unsupported, doubtful, and weak | |||||||||
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Bradley Monton (2006). God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):405-424.
Trent Dougherty & Ted Poston (2008). A User's Guide to Design Arguments. Religious Studies 44 (1):99-110.
R. White (2011). What Fine-Tuning's Got to Do with It: A Reply to Weisberg. Analysis 71 (4):676-679.
Graham Wood (2006). The Fine-Tuning Argument: The ‘Design Inference’ Version. Religious Studies 42 (4):467-471.
Mark Colyvan, Jay L. Garfield & Graham Priest (2005). Problems with the Argument From Fine Tuning. Synthese 145 (3):325 - 338.
Bradley Monton (2006). God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):405-424.
Neil A. Manson (2009). The Fine-Tuning Argument. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):271-286.
Theodore M. Drange (2000). The Fine-Tuning Argument Revisited. Philo 3 (2):38-49.
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