A framework for misrepresenting knowledge
In Martin Ringle (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence. Humanities Press (1979)
|Abstract||This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Hubert L. Dreyfus (2002). Samuel Todes's Account of Non-Conceptual Perceptual Knowledge and its Relation to Thought. Ratio 15 (4):392-409.
Ingrid Smithey Fulmer, Bruce Barry & D. Adam Long (2009). Lying and Smiling: Informational and Emotional Deception in Negotiation. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 88 (4):691 - 709.
Eduardo Mercado & Scott O. Murray (1999). Explicit Knowledge in Dolphins? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):774-775.
Rachel Brown (2004). The Emplotted Self: Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Papers 32 (3):279-300.
Karen Neander (1995). Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning. Philosophical Studies 79 (2):109-41.
Hubert L. Dreyfus (1986). Misrepresenting Human Intelligence. Thought 61 (4):430-441.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?