Grazer Philosophische Studien 8:253-269 (1979)
|Abstract||Two general approaches to the analysis of knowledge are distinguished: a liberal view that takes the truth of what is known as a condition independent of the justificatory condition, and a conservative view that regards the truth of what is known as implied by the level of justification required for knowledge. Chisholm is classified as a liberal on perceptual knowledge, and his analysis is criticized from a conservative standpoint|
|Keywords||Epistemology Knowledge Perception Truth Condition Chisholm, R|
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