First person warrant: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Psyche 7 (11) (2001)
I agree with Siewert's claims about the special character and importance of phenomenal consciousness and the impossibility of providing a satisfactory functionalist reduction of it. I question, however, his dismissal of a representational theory of conscious experience. I also question his account of how conscious agents are supposed to know, or enjoy first person warrant, for their belief that they are conscious
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